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CAN THE EU ANCHOR POLICY REFORM IN THIRD COUNTRIES?  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE EURO-MED PARTNERSHIP 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The emerging literature on ‘anchoring’ draws attention to non-conventional benefits 
of regional integration arrangements, which include increased policy credibility. 
Nevertheless, this literature tends to view the anchoring of policy reform as an 
exogenously-given option for a reforming country. We demonstrate that anchoring is 
an endogenously-determined choice, which may guarantee neither optimal levels of 
policy reform nor effective anchoring unless the relevant contracts are both complete 
and incentive-compatible. We examine the economic pillar of the Euro-Med 
Partnership (EMP) to ascertain the extent to which its contractual provisions satisfy 
these conditions. Our findings suggest that EMP leaves too much room for discretion 
and does not internalise the positive externalities associated with policy reform. These 
findings enable us to elaborate on why the EU cannot be expected to function as an 
effective anchor for policy reform in its trading partners.  
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CAN THE EU ANCHOR POLICY REFORM IN THIRD COUNTRIES?  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE EURO-MED PARTNERSHIP  
 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Anchoring’ is a policy design issue that arises because of the time-inconsistency of 
optimal policy choices. Kydland and Prescott (1977) have demonstrated that time-
inconsistency can be avoided by adherence to domestic rules.  If domestic rules 
cannot be enacted due to political constraints, the time-inconsistency problem can be 
resolved by selecting an external anchor that would tie the policy-maker’s hands.  
 
In the last decade, the debate concerning the causes and consequences of external 
constraints on governments has become more diverse. One strand focuses on the 
motives for and consequences of agreements with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). For example Vreeland (2001, 2003) demonstrates that governments 
concluding IMF agreements are those who find it difficult to pursue structural reforms 
because of resistance from powerful domestic interest groups. This finding, however, 
must be considered in conjunction with those indicating that compliance with IMF 
conditionality has been limited. (For a review, see IMF, 2001).  
 
Another and more recent strand examines the causes and consequences of increased 
legalisation in international relations. Goldstein et al (2004) lead a team of 
international relations and political economy scholars in a special issue of 
International Organization to discuss, inter alia, the proliferation of legally-binding 
multilateral and regional agreements, the extent of compliance with these agreements, 
and the long-term implications of legalization for international relations. Some 
findings, for example those of Abbott and Snidal (2004), suggest that governments 
may be induced to prefer legalization because the latter increases the credibility of 
policy commitments and reduces transaction costs.  
 
The third strand, which is more closely related to the content of this article, examines 
the extent to which regional integration agreements (RIAs) between developed and 
developing countries can anchor policy reforms in the latter. In this context, François 
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(1997) states that the North American Free Trade Agreement has benefited Mexico by 
‘binding’ Mexican reforms and reducing the risk premium on inward capital flows. 
Galal and Hoekman (1997a: 3; 1997b) are also optimistic that association agreements 
within the Euro-Med Partnership (EMP) will enhance the credibility of the 
Mediterranean governments’s (MGs) commitment to policy reform. Specifically, they 
state that the free trade area agreements ‘can act as an anchor for government policy’ 
and signal to investors that ‘the government is unlikely to reverse its liberalization 
policies in the future.’ 
 
In this article, we aim to contribute to the ongoing debate by examining the likely 
impacts of the association agreements (AAs) and EU aid conditionality in the EMP 
context on policy reform performance of the Mediterranean countries (MCs) that are 
not EU members. Specifically, we aim to establish the extent to which the EMP 
contracts may or may not increase the credibility of the MGs’ commitment to policy 
reform. The credibility of the commitment is measured as the level of compliance 
with EMP contracts.  
 
The article is organized in two sections. In section 1, we first review the literature on 
the relationship between external constraints (including anchors) and reform 
performance in reforming countries. Then, we use a model of exchange to 
demonstrate that the agreements concluded by an anchor-sponsoring entity (the EU) 
and an anchor-seeking government (the MG) are endogenous outcomes of strategic 
interaction between the two and that they do not necessarily ensure an optimal degree 
of compliance by a reforming MG. In section 2, we pursue two objectives. First, we 
identify the conditions that must be satisfied to achieve an optimal degree of 
compliance. Then, immediately after each condition specified, we examine the free 
trade and aid provisions of the EMP in order to establish the extent to which the latter 
satisfies the relevant condition. We conclude by pulling together the main findings 
and comment on the EU’s capacity to act as an effective anchor for policy reform in 
non-member countries in general. 
 
1.  Anchoring Policy Reform: A Political Economy Model 
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The regional integration version of the ‘anchoring’ literature tends to conceptualise 
anchors as exogenously given commitment devices. What is involved here is that a 
reforming government chooses to tie its hands with the aim of minimising the risk of 
deviations from the drive towards trade liberalisation and structural reforms. Our 
contention is that a reforming MG would not necessarily choose an exogenously-
given and binding regime that would tie its hands in a number of trade- and 
governance-related policy areas. This is obvious from the fact that a reforming 
government decides on the anchor to be chosen on the basis of prior bargaining with 
the anchor-sponsoring actor/entity. To the extent that this is the case, the outcome 
(i.e., the nature of the anchoring device) would be influenced by the political economy 
of the reforming country and the nature of the exchange between the latter and the EU 
as an anchor-sponsoring actor.  
 
The political economy of a reforming country may have two opposing effects on its 
choice of anchor. On the one hand, and as Vreeland (2001 and 2003) demonstrates, a 
strong domestic constraint may induce a reforming MG to opt for an external anchor 
in order to overcome domestic resistance to reform.1
 
 Vreeland’s findings suggest that 
the larger the number of veto groups in the reforming country are, the more likely it is 
that the reforming government would seek and conclude agreements with the IMF. In 
other words, IMF conditionality emerges as a useful anchoring device when domestic 
resistance to policy change is high. On the other hand, and as Vreeland himself and a 
large number of studies reviewed below demonstrate, the willingness to conclude 
agreements with the IMF does not necessarily entail compliance. Therefore, we are 
faced with the question as to whether reforming countries may be inclined to choose 
anchoring mechanisms that would be ineffective in ensuring compliance.  
Similarly, the nature of the exchange between anchor-seeking and anchor-sponsoring 
actors may also have opposing effects on anchor choice. To understand why this may 
be the case, we need to bear in mind that policy reform has some public good 
characteristics. The benefits that follow policy reform accrue not only the reforming 
country but also to the anchor-sponsoring actor. Benefits for the reforming country 
                                                     
1 The domestic resistance to reform is stronger the more the government’s survival depends on the 
distribution of protectionist rents and satisfaction of ‘veto group’ demands. On government-interest 
group relations in general, see Olson (1982). On the negative effect of veto groups on policy change, 
see Tsebelis (1995). 
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are straightforward: less policy capture by vested interests; reduced distortions in the 
domestic economy; higher levels of growth/employment, reduced risk premiums 
required by international creditors; larger foreign direct investment inflows, etc.2 
Benefits for the anchor-sponsoring actor are no less significant: reduced negative 
spill-over effects through migration, terrorism or political instability associated with 
underdevelopment in the reforming country; improved access to the reforming 
country’s market as a result of reciprocal trade liberalisation; increased scope for 
direct investment flows, etc.3
 
  
Because of the positive externalities associated with policy reform, the anchor-
seeking government would be inclined to link the level of reforms to the contributions 
that the anchor-sponsoring entity would provide. In fact, it is in the interest of the 
reforming government to secure the maximum level of contributions and deliver the 
minimum amount of policy reform, which entails short-run costs. The short-run costs 
range from weakening political support for the reforming government to adverse 
effects on income distribution. In contrast, the anchor-sponsoring actor would be 
motivated to maximise the level of reforms to be realised by the reforming country 
and minimise its contributions towards the cost of such reforms. Stated differently, the 
anchor-sponsoring actor would be in favour of stringent anchoring (or conditionality) 
and minimum level of compensation payments.  
 
These dynamics have been examined widely in the existing literature on IMF 
conditionality and legalisation of inter-state relations. For example, research findings 
on IMF conditionality suggest that conditionality has not been effective in securing 
the expected level of policy reform in recipient countries. One indicator is recipient 
non-compliance. The rate of non-compliance between 1973-97 is reported by Moussa 
and Savastano (1999) as 54.5 percent. Interestingly, non-compliance has increased as 
the IMF has become more experienced in designing and negotiating conditionality. 
                                                     
 
2 We assume that policy reform (i.e., trade liberalisation and structural reforms) produces long-term 
benefits for MGs. This assumption is based not on hard evidence (which we cannot review due to space 
limitation) but on revealed MG preferences in favour of international agreements that require such 
reforms.  
 
3 This specification is in line with EU preferences revealed in Barcelona Declaration.  On the expected 
benefits of the ‘Barcelona process’ and the EMP, see Xenakis and Chryssochou (2001). 
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For example, non-compliance increased from about 50 percent in 1970s to about 72 
percent in the 1990s.4
 
  
Another indicator can be gleaned from Mosley (1987), who finds out that negotiations 
with the World Bank have generally resulted in unstable compromises – mainly 
because the tightness of World Bank conditionality tended to be inversely related to 
the borrowing country’s bargaining power. Consequently, conditionality was 
relatively more punitive on ‘weak’ countries in need of World Bank lending, but 
relatively more lenient on ‘strong’ countries where structural reform rather than 
lending was necessary.  
 
A third indicator relates to mismatch between IMF structural adjustment credits and 
the policy environment in recipient countries. Recent work demonstrates that IMF 
credits tended to favour policy environments that are too weak and to diminish in 
policy environments that are sufficiently good for funds to be effective. As a result, 
either disbursement/implementation remains inefficient (Collier and Gunning, 1999); 
or credits contribute to growth only in countries that are already committed to reform 
and macroeconomic stability (Burnside and Dollar, 1998). Similar findings led Dollar 
and Svensson (2000) to conclude that international financial institutions (a subset of 
anchor-sponsoring actors) have essentially been picking up winners rather than 
increasing the recipient’s commitment to reforms.  
 
More recent studies on the legalisation of international relations also come up with 
similar findings. For example, Goldstein et al (2004) point out that compliance with 
judgements of international tribunals or World Trade Organisation (WTO) decisions 
has been uneven and that unilateral actions continue to take place. This hypothesis is 
supported by the findings of the case studies in the special issue of International 
Organization referred to above. For example, Goldstein and Martin (2004) conclude 
that legalization has had only limited effects on national compliance and international 
co-operation in the area of international trade, despite the fact that legalisation in this 
policy area has been the most extensive. Goldstein and Martin relate this finding to 
                                                     
 
4 Non-compliance is measured as failure to disburse (or withdraw) at least 75 percent of the total IMF 
loan under a particular arrangement.  
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the possibility that legalisation may not enable policy makers to circumvent domestic 
politics. In fact, the authors argue that the impact of legalisation on compliance is 
mediated through domestic politics – the very factor that the proponents of anchoring 
expect to be circumvented.  
 
These findings are not surprising. They are related to the endogenous nature of the 
international agreements that reforming governments conclude with anchor-
sponsoring governments or international institutions. Because of the heterogeneity of 
the interests and because of the positive externalities associated with policy reform, 
parties to anchoring arrangements may conclude agreements that are sub-optimal for 
three reasons. First, heterogeneity of interests requires a high degree of discretion to 
be enjoyed by both anchor-seeking and anchor-sponsoring actors. That is because 
discretion enables either party to avoid compliance with existing agreements when 
compliance is considered to be undermining a vital (national, institutional or regional) 
interest. Secondly, the positive externalities associated with policy reform are 
conducive to sub-optimal supply of reforms. This is likely to be the case because the 
anchor-sponsoring actor would prefer to benefit from the positive externalities 
without contributing to the cost of policy reform. To the extent that the anchor-
sponsoring actor engages in such free riding, the reforming government would reduce 
the supply of reforms. Finally, the anchor-sponsoring party would be reluctant to 
contribute to the cost of reforms on the grounds that reforms are essentially an issue 
for the reforming country and that the benefits of reform accrue mainly to that 
country. 
 
For these reasons, in the specific context of the EMP, a reforming MG would be 
inclined to minimise its commitment to reforms and maximise side-payments by EU. 
This is in order to: (i) facilitate the construction of alliances with domestic 
actors/groups who would benefit from EU concessions; and (ii) ensure that the EU 
internalises the positive externalities associated with policy reform. In contrast, the 
EU would be inclined to minimise side-payments but maximise the extent of 
compliance with the agreements to be concluded. That is why it is necessary to derive 
the implications of these considerations at an analytical level that captures the 
strategic bargaining between the two parties. 
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We model bargaining between a reforming MG and the anchor-sponsoring EU as an 
exchange involving two goods: (i) anchoring facility with side-payments; and (ii) 
policy reform. Policy reform by MG has some public good characteristics in that it 
reduces the risk of migration and security threats that the EU would face if MGs did 
not embark on policy reform. In addition, policy reform will be supplied after the EU 
and MG have agreed on the terms of exchange. Given its public good characteristics 
and the timing of its supply, policy reform will be supplied optimally only if all 
beneficiaries contribute to the cost of supply in line with the benefits they would 
derive.5
 
  
On the other hand, the good supplied by the EU (i.e., anchoring facility with side-
payments) is a composite good. Some of its benefits (e.g., access to the EU market 
and aid) are rival and excludable. However, other benefits (e.g., the credibility bonus 
derived from adopting the EU acquis.) are non-rival, non-excludable. Unlike reforms, 
however, the EU acquis already exists and its adoption by MG does not increase its 
cost for the EU. Given these conditions, the EMP could be a sub-optimal anchoring 
arrangement – as can be seen in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
 
The model consists of two sides’ offer curves for two goods with public good 
characteristics. While the EU offers anchoring facility with side-payments, the MG 
offers policy reform. EU and MG offer curves are Oe and Om, respectively. Each offer 
curve depicts the levels of ‘exports’ that each party is willing to offer in return for 
given levels of imports. Suppose that both parties agreed to a contract envisaging 
exchange at point A. Suppose also that the terms of trade are known and given by the 
gradient of line OT. Then the level of exchange at is optimal for three reasons. First, 
point A lies on both offer curves, so that any movement along Oe or Om towards the 
                                                     
 
5 The classical contribution to the theory of public good is Samuelson (1956). An accessible treatment 
is in Boadway and Bruce (1984). For a literature review, see Oakland (1987).  
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origin will make the EU or the MG worse off . Secondly, at A the marginal rate of 
substitution in consumption (MRSC) is equal to the marginal rate of transformation in 
production (MRTP), as given by the slopes of the indifference curves Im and Ie  that 
are tangent to each other. Finally, at A, MRTP = MRSC = Terms of Trade (gradient 
of OT) = world prices, so resource allocation is efficient.  
 
However, A is not Nash equilibrium, from which neither party has an incentive to 
deviate. For example, MG would be better off if it could trade at B rather than A. 
Diagrammatically, this is obvious because the indifference curve at B (Im2) is higher 
than that at A (Im1). The substantive reason as to why MG would be better off at B can 
be seen from the improvement in its terms of trade. At B, MG is importing a higher 
level of anchoring facility plus side-payments (Fb > Fa) in return for less exports of 
reform (Rb < Ra). This is nothing but an improvement in MG’s terms of trade.  
 
Therefore, there are incentives for MG to shift on to a new offer curve such as Om2 
that intersects with the EU’s offer curve at B. The new offer curve indicates that MG 
has introduced restrictions on imports of anchoring facility and forced EU to increase 
side-payments in order to counterbalance the effect of reduced demand. Hence, MG’s 
terms of trade improve and those of the EU worsen. At this stage of the game, the EU 
has two options for improving its welfare: (i) inducing or forcing MG to repeal the 
restriction it has imposed and return to point A; or (ii) taking an action that would 
improve its own terms of trade. If the contract is incomplete (i.e., if EMP does not 
provide for credible sanctioning against non-compliance), the first option is not 
available. Then EU will have to retaliate by reducing side-payments and improving its 
own terms of trade through a rightward shift in its offer curve, say to Oe2. Now EU’s 
welfare-maximising level of exchange will be at C, where its offer and indifference 
curves (Oe2 and Ie3) are tangent.  
 
At C, however, MG is worse off compared to B. Then, MG can be expected to 
retaliate by a new round of restriction. This strategic interaction leads to two possible 
outcomes: either no trade at all at point O or a sub-optimal level of trade at any point 
between O and A. In a seminal article, Johnson (1953) demonstrates that the Nash 
equilibrium for such a game will be restricted trade rather than no trade. That is 
because the benefits of restricted trade dominate the loss that each party will incur 
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when trade is suspended. So, the Nash equilibrium for the EU and MG will imply a 
positive level of anchoring facilities and reforms, but this level will be sub-optimal 
compared to the level at A.  
 
2. The EMP’s Anchoring Capacity: Can It Be Improved? 
 
The analysis above suggests that bargaining between the EU and MGs does not 
necessarily lead to optimal anchoring in the EMP context. In this section, we will 
examine the provisions of the AAs and aid conditionality to ascertain the extent to 
which this is the case and what the EU can do to emerge as an effective anchor for 
policy reform in its Mediterranean partners.  
 
 
2.1 Completeness of the agreements 
 
The analysis above suggests that, to function as an effective anchor, the EMP should 
leave minimum scope for discretion. Otherwise, discretion would make the agreed 
and ex ante optimal levels of reform and anchoring unsustainable. This is because 
discretion enables any of the parties to free ride on the efforts of the other. Hence, it 
would unravel any agreement ex post, irrespective of whether the EU and MGs begin 
with optimal contracts. 
 
Therefore, the first condition (C1) that the EMP must satisfy in order to function as an 
effective anchor can be stated as follows: agreements under the EMP must be as 
complete as possible to prevent biased interpretations and/or ex post non-compliance. 
Now let us examine the extent to which the AAs and aid agreements under the EMP 
satisfy this condition. 
 
Association Agreements (AAs) within the EMP are inter-governmental instruments to 
which the rules of international public law apply. They can be suspended by one of 
the parties only if an ‘essential element’ is not respected by the other. This ‘essential 
element clause’, however, refers to compliance with the principles of the UN Charter, 
such as human rights and political freedom; but does not extend to ‘the principles of a 
market economy’. This exemption demonstrates the extent to which either party can 
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violate the AA’s economic-commercial provisions without incurring the cost of 
suspension. It is also important to note that AAs’ trade provisions can be suspended 
only by unanimous decision of the Council (Flaesch-Mougin, 2000:  83).6
 
 So, it is 
easier for MGs to suspend the agreement by invoking the ‘essential element clause’ 
than it is for the EU. This asymmetry further reduces the credibility of the EU’s threat 
aimed at securing compliance by MGs.  
In addition, AAs provide for the settlement of disputes by bilateral consultations 
within the Association Council (AC) - a body that monitors implementation and 
decides by unanimity. Given that the AC is composed of EU and MG representatives, 
the unanimity rule implies that the AC’s role as an enforcer would be highly limited. 
Of course, there is always the possibility to retaliate, since AAs are based on the 
principle of reciprocity. Should an MG (or the EU) fail to comply with tariff 
dismantling schedules for industrial products, the EU (or the MG) can always react 
tit-for-tat by re-establishing the most-favoured-nation duties (i.e. the usual Common 
Customs Tariff) on imports originating in the partner.  
 
Tit-for-tat reactions may enable either party to avoid impasse that could be caused by 
unanimous decision making within the AC, but it does not ensure completeness of the 
agreement. Consider a situation where an MG fails to comply with AA provisions. A 
tit-for-tat reaction by the EU may be costly for the non-complying MG, but it cannot 
ensure the continuity of the agreement. In other words, the EU may well suspend the 
concessions upon the MG’s failure to comply, but it cannot prevent the MG from 
withdrawing from the agreement. Moreover, tit-for-tat measures are not specified and 
linked to specific implementation failures. As a result, there is a significant element of 
discretion inherent in tit-for-tat reactions. Given such discretion, a MG can always 
accuse the EU with violating the AA or being too excessive/unjust in its reaction – 
even if in that particular case the EU’s tit-for-tat reaction were appropriate.  
 
Similar problems exist in another economic component of the EMP, namely the 
MEDA Programme under which the EU grants bilateral aid ‘to accompany the reform 
of economic and social structures’ in Mediterranrean countries (MCs). This is 
                                                     
6 This is why it is now so difficult for the EU to consider trade sanctions in the form of suspending the 
AA with Israel. 
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provided for in the Council Regulation 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 (the MEDA 
Regulation), which covers all eligible MCs under a unified framework (see Philippart, 
2001; Guggenbuhl and Theelen, 2000; Clara Mira Salama 2002). Slightly less than €1 
billion per year, drawn from the EU’s own budgetary resources, are distributed on a 
bilateral basis among 8 MGs, all of which belong to the Arab world. Turkey, as a 
candidate country, is a beneficiary of MEDA funds but it also receives aid under the 
‘Pre-Accession Strategy’7
 
. In addition to the annual €1 billion drawn from the EU 
budget, the European Investment Bank (EIB) provides 1 billion Euros for MCs in the 
form of loans.  
The MEDA Regulation explicitly aims to promote good governance in MCs and 
‘progress towards structural reform’. These aims are additional to the trade 
liberalisation provided for in the AAs. In addition, the MEDA Regulation provides for 
Council decisions on the basis of qualified majority if ‘an essential element’ for the 
continuation of the support measures is missing. The Council, acting by qualified 
majority, can take ‘appropriate measures’ upon a proposal from the Commission. 
Therefore, the EMP’s MEDA component may be closer to a complete agreement 
compared to the AAs. However, even the MEDA Regulation is still far from fulfilling 
the requirements for complete contracting. 
 
One reason is that the Council may not be able to act by qualified majority. Given the 
differences in foreign policy priorities of the member states, it is doubtful that 
sanctions could be imposed against MGs without a consensus incorporating Spain, 
Italy, Portugal or Greece who, compared to other member states, tend to place a 
higher premium on EU-Mediterranean relations. The other reason as to why the 
MEDA Regulation may fall short of a complete contracting is that the indicative 
amount earmarked for an MG is linked not only to its country’s need, but also to the 
amount earmarked for other MGs. As Philippart (2001) has indicated, each MG is told 
on an indicative basis the total amount it is likely to receive, but it is not told what 
other MGs would be receiving. As a result, the nine MGs compete for one pot of 
multi-annual financial resources (€3,435 million for MEDA I of 1995-1999 and 
                                                     
7 Israel is not entitled to receive bilateral aid, in view of its own development level. Programmes and 
relations concerning three candidate countries (Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) are monitored by DG 
Enlargement and not by DG External Relations.  
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€5,350 million for MEDA II of 2000-2006). So allocations are only provisional and 
this leaves scope for introducing conditions ex post. These conditions may be 
presented as necessary to ‘take into account’ each country’s reform performance, but 
they may actually reflect ad hoc changes caused by changing EU priorities. Any such 
discretion would weaken compliance with the contracts because an individual MG 
does not exactly know if, how and how much it would be rewarded or penalised.  
 
Perhaps one should not read too much into what is hypothetically presented above, 
because in practice the disbursed and earmarked amounts were more or less the same. 
The surprise has come with the implementation of MEDA II, adopted in 2000. The 
EU has decided ex post to support the Palestinian Authority beyond what was 
expected initially and to the detriment of other eight MGs (Mira Salama, 2002). A 
more damaging example of discretion relates to the practice of earmarking MEDA 
funds for purposes other than those initially contemplated. For instance the 
Commission has recently suggested using bilateral MEDA funds to assist Arab 
countries to contain illegal migration to Europe rather than to undertake reforms that 
would eventually reduce migration pressure. (See, Commission of the EC, 2002: 6).   
 
The analysis above demonstrates that the AAs and the MEDA Regulation leave ample 
scope for discretion by both parties. Given this scope for discretion, governmental and 
societal actors in both the EU and MCs will be motivated to force deviations from the 
commitments codified in the AAs and the MEDA Regulation. That is because these 
actors would expect their lobbying/pressure for non-compliance to bear fruit given the 
scope for manoeuvring that exist for their policy makers. The lobbying/pressure for 
non-compliance is likely to be higher in the MCs because the latter bear the largest 
portion of the reform costs and their governments are characterised by a higher degree 
of vulnerability to interest group pressure. Therefore, as they stand, AAs and the 
MEDA Regulation may not be conducive to a high degree of compliance by MCs – 
i.e., the economic pillar of the EMP may not be an effective anchor for policy reform.  
 
 
2.2  Incentive compatibility of anchoring arrangements  
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The second condition that the EMP must satisfy for effective anchoring can be 
derived from the incentive compatibility of the EMP contracts. As Hurwicz (1973) 
has demonstrated, contracts are incentive-compatible only if they take into account 
the welfare-maximising behaviour of the agents involved. To assess the incentive-
compatibility of the EMP, we need to focus on the production of the goods traded in 
Figure 1.  
 
As indicated above, the exchange between the EU and MGs involve policy reform by 
MGs in return for anchoring facility plus side payments by the EU. These ‘goods’ 
have some public good characteristics and are produced sequentially.  Whereas the 
anchoring facility (i.e., the trade and trade-related policy regime that the reforming 
MG would adopt) exists before the EMP contracts, policy reform and side payments 
occur after the conclusion of the EMP contracts. Under these circumstances, the EU 
enjoys an inbuilt competitive advantage because it incurs only the cost of side 
payments (i.e., market access and aid) without any extra cost associated with the 
exporting of its trade liberalisation regime. The MG, however, suffers from an inbuilt 
competitive disadvantage because it incurs the cost of reforms as well as reciprocal 
market access extended to the EU.  
 
This asymmetry in competitive advantages does not eliminate the potential for welfare 
gains from an optimal anchoring arrangement. However, it increases the probability of 
non-compliance by the MG. In other words, and as demonstrated in Figure 1 above, the 
MG is likely to restrict the supply of reform at each level of side payments by the EU. 
This would have the effect of increasing the MG’s terms of trade and decreasing those of 
the EU. Faced with this risk, the EU can reduce the probability of unilateral action by the 
MG by increasing the level of side payments. An increase in EU side-payments makes 
the MG’s offer curve steeper (i.e.., improves the MG’s terms of trade improve).8
 
 
Improved terms of trade would reduce the incentive for the MG to engage in unilateral 
action. The overall result is that the initial contracts would be more incentive-compatible 
for the MG and reduce the risk of non-compliance.  
                                                     
8 The steeper the MG’s original offer curve (Om1) is, the more likely it is to intersect with EU’s offer 
curve (Oe1) nearer point B in Figure 1. In other words, the distance between A and B will be reduced and 
there will be less incentive for MG to violate the contract that envisages exchange at point A. 
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Then, the second condition (C2) for an efficient EMP design can be stated as follows: 
unilateral EU side-payments to MG must be large enough to reduce the cost of 
reforms and reflect the level of positive externalities associated with reforms in MCs. 
Now let us examine the extent to which EU side payments (i.e., financial assistance 
and market access) under the EMP satisfy this condition. 
 
The objective of EU financial assistance is to help MCs to adjust to the free trade 
conditions contemplated in the EMP. The avowed intention is to promote (further) 
economic reform by linking aid to reform performance. In political economy terms it 
seems natural that the linkage reflects a political compromise among the 15 EU member 
states, rather than among the 27 members of the EMP. In addition, the MEDA is an EC 
regulation - not part of AAs providing for industrial free trade between EU and MCs. It 
is important therefore to note that, legally speaking, the EU ‘carrots’ (MEDA 
assistance) and the MC’s commitment to eliminate industrial tariffs on EU-originating 
products are not directly linked. At the most, the link is indirect.  
 
Suppose that a MG implements trade liberalization in accordance with timetables 
inscribed in the AA. There is no explicit guarantee that MEDA assistance will then 
increase accordingly. In other words, there is what can be described as asymmetric 
conditionality. Whereas the EU can condition its increased MEDA assistance to the 
implementation of the AA provisions, the MG is not in a position to ensure that 
disbursements under MEDA or EIB loans reflect its reform efforts. There is also 
inconsistency of time frames: MEDA calendars are administratively linked to the EU’s 
overall multi-annual financial programmes and not to the reform timetables provided 
for in the bilateral AAs.  
 
Concerning short-run costs to be borne by MCs, the only component that seems to be 
amenable to fairly reliable evaluation is the amount of fiscal revenue foregone as a 
result of eliminating customs duties on imports from EU. This is an important issue 
particularly for Lebanon and Tunisia, but also for all remaining Arab MCs. In 
Morocco’s case, it has been estimated that revenue loss would represent more than 3 
percent of GDP at the end of the 12-year transitional period. The equivalent figure for 
Tunisia would be 6% (Mira-Salama, 2002). Other sources indicate that revenue losses 
as a share of total tax revenues would be 19% for Algeria, 16% for Tunisia, 12% for 
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Jordan, 10% for Morocco, 8 % for Egypt and 7% for Syria (Nienhaus, 1999: 509).  
There are also other empirical studies produced by international institutions such as 
the World Bank, the IMF or some NGOs and academic independent researchers 
evaluating trade, employment and welfare effects of the association agreements (see, 
for example, FEMISE, 2000; Ghesquiere, 1998; Havrylyshyn, 1997).  
 
However, what is far more important for MC leaders but much more difficult to 
assess are the short-run costs and risks associated with implementation of trade 
liberalisation and other policy reforms. For instance, how to gauge the risks involved 
in having to replace customs duties by new taxes, such as VAT? How will the 
business community react to that? What about political parties and the public at large? 
Evidence from the case of Malta, where the introduction of VAT led to the downfall 
of the pro-EU conservative government in 1996, shows what might be at stake. What 
about cutting public expenditure, such as food consumption subsidies? Is that not 
likely to lead to riots, as was the case in Egypt (1977), Tunisia( 1978, 1984), Morocco 
(1981, 1984), Algeria (1988) and Jordan (1989). (See Richards and Waterbury, 1996: 
268).      
 
Despite measurement difficulties, however, we can rank-order the MCs in terms of 
their standing on the reform ladder and the level of EU assistance they receive. Table 
1 below is presented for this purpose. The MCs’ standing on the reform ladder is 
based on a composite index consisting of their ranks in the following areas where 
World Bank data is available: trade as percentage of GDP (trade openness), net 
private capital flows (indicator of macroeconomic stability and good governance); 
foreign direct investment as percent of GDP (indicator of good governance and 
protection of property rights), private fixed investment as percentage of gross 
domestic fixed investment (indicator of private sector involvement); and stock market 
valuation (indicator of the depth of the capital market). Obviously, the composite 
index thus defined may not be a reliable indicator of the country’s standing on the 
reform ladder. That is mainly because some components of the index are influenced 
by country size – in addition to its reform achievement. Nevertheless, the resulting 
index can still be taken as a meaningful indicator of reform because the size effect 
work both ways: while it makes the country seems less open (hence lower on the 
 18 
reform ladder) in terms of trade/GDP ratio, this bias is counterbalanced by an upward 
bias implied by the stock market capitalisation figures.  
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
A quick glance at Table 1 clearly reveals that the per capita MEDA assistance 
received is not closely related to the level of reforms achieved by end of 1999. The 
weak correlation is an indicator of EU’s inability to act as an effective and credible 
anchor for reforms in MCs – in both ex ante and ex post conditionality terms. If 
MEDA assistance was conditioned on ex ante reform promises, lack of correlation 
means that MCs that kept their promises were not rewarded accordingly. If, however, 
MEDA assistance was conditional on actual performance, lack of correlation implies 
that MCs failing to undertake reforms were not penalised. Of course, one can argue 
that Turkey is an outlier because of the Greco-Turkish disputes that led to the Greek 
veto of financial aid to Turkey. However, this is an exception that proves rather than 
disproves the discretion/uncertainty involved. It strengthens the impression that 
MEDA assistance seems to be highly sensitive to foreign policy considerations, 
concerns about immigration risks, or straightforward favouritism. (On the contrast 
with what was expected by Bretton Woods institutions, see Alonso-Gamo et al., 1997: 
35).  
 
2.3 Discounting rates and the effectiveness of the EMP anchor 
 
The third condition for ensuring that the EMP functions as an effective anchor is 
derived from an implicit assumption that underpins the model in Figure 1. The model 
assumes that the future benefits of anchoring reforms are not discounted. This 
assumption implies that the EU and MGs have the same discount rate of zero. This 
assumption, however, is not realistic. Existing signals suggests that the EU tends to 
emphasise the long-term benefits of the partnership, which are specified as improved 
competitiveness/efficiency, stable macroeconomic environment, stable institutions, 
etc which are conducive to economic and political stability and security in the region. 
MCs, however, tend to be concerned about short-term benefits such as improved 
market access, financial aid, immediate flows of foreign direct investment, etc. These 
signals indicate that MCs discount the future more heavily than the EU.  
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As Cramton (1985: 172) has indicated, bargaining games tend to produce inefficient 
results when the buyer’s discount rate is higher than that of the seller. If the buyer’s 
discount rate is higher, the future value of the exchange is declining fast for the buyer. 
Given declining future value, the exchange must take place sooner rather than later. 
Otherwise, the exchange may not take place at all.  Under this condition, bargaining 
does not lead to an improvement on the ex ante outcome that dominates the outcome 
of sequential bargaining. According to this finding, lengthy bargaining on reciprocal 
trade liberalisation and side payments is inefficient in increasing the probability of 
implementing the EMP contract. Then, the third conclusion (C3) about the EMP’s 
design can be stated as follows: the EU must come up with front-loaded side-payment 
offers, which must be as close as possible to the eventual offers and increase as the 
MG’s future discount rate increases. This condition also has some parallelism with 
the findings of Kennedy (1995), who demonstrate that side-payments by developed 
countries have increased the probability of successful completion of the Uruguay 
Round.  
 
When examined in the light of this condition, it can be seen that the EMP has not 
resulted in new and significant EU trade concessions to MCs. Previous cooperation 
agreements already provided for duty-free access for MCs’ industrial exports (since 1 
July 1977). In fact, the only trade-related concession made by the EU was elimination 
of a few remaining restrictions on textile and clothing imports. However, this 
concession came at a time when the EU had already agreed to phase out the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA) restrictions against other developing countries by 2005. This was 
a result of the 1994 agreement on textiles and clothing during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. 
 
The Commission, in its initial proposal of October 1994, did ask member states to make 
some offers in the agricultural domain but, the Barcelona Declaration of November 
1995 did not contemplate free trade in agricultural goods at all. Generally, bilateral 
AAs state that five years after the agreements were signed, negotiations on agriculture 
shall take place, but no time limit is set about when they must be concluded. In 
addition, EU tends to detach agricultural concessions from MC’s overall liberalisation 
effort. Instead, it insists on reciprocity at sectoral level. True, at the EMP level, there 
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is some discussion about reforming the common agricultural policy (CAP) with 
respect to goods significant for MCs. However such reform would not result from the 
EU’s need to accommodate the trade interests of MCs but rather those of the United 
States and Latin America, a sine qua non for the ‘Doha Round’ and EU-Mercosur 
negotiations, respectively, to succeed.   
 
Secondly, the EU failed to come forward with meaningful concessions with respect to 
rules of origin and cumulation. In a document prepared for the Barcelona Conference, 
the Commission was willing to consider the possibility of cumulating value in different 
MCs for the purpose of defining the origin of products benefiting from duty-free 
treatment in the EU (Commission of the EC, 1994). However, diagonal cumulation (as 
this particular form of cumulation is called) has not been put in place seven years after 
the EMP was launched. In fact, it is not likely to be introduced at all because since then 
the Commission has changed its mind about the form of cumulation it wants to 
introduce. In 2001, the Commission accepted, in principle, that MCs should be 
incorporated in the Pan-European cumulation system (which includes Eastern European 
countries). If implemented, this could potentially be a huge bonus for Eastern 
Mediterranean countries in particular - where input complementarities seem more 
prevalent than the Maghreb.  
 
However, a document prepared for the meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign 
Ministers in Valencia in April 2002 leaves no doubt that the Pan-European system of 
cumulation will take a very long time to introduce – if it is introduced at all. That is 
because the system would require: (a) agreement of all current members of the pan-
European system (including CEECs); (b) amendments in the association agreements; 
and (c) MCs concluding free trade agreements with identical rules of origin. (See, 
Commission of the EC, 2002).  
 
It is obvious that pan-European cumulation would be a more generous regime than the 
one contemplated previously, but it will take much more time to implement in view of 
what is said above. The whole idea may be turned into a joke if, at the date of 
implementation, most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariffs applied by the EU become 
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redundant as a result of the coming Doha Round.9
 
 Cumulation makes sense only 
insofar as there is a sufficiently high preference margin justifying the time and money 
to be spent by Mediterranean industrialists in order to comply with (cumulated) rules of 
origin - e.g. maintaining separate stocks according to their origin, separate accountancy 
systems, lawyers’ fees, etc. In addition, and even if cumulation became applicable and 
remained meaningful, it would no longer be related to the original aim – which is 
inducing and anchoring policy reform in MCs. 
This apparent lack of front-loaded EU concessions must be considered in conjunction 
with incentives for MGs to deviate from the reform commitment. Table 2 below 
demonstrates that almost all MCs for which data is available (except Algeria and Syria) 
have been constantly running deficits in their trade with the EU. In addition, the trade 
deficit tends to increase over time (Youngs, 2001). According to FEMISE (2000), 
MCs’ trade deficit with the EU increased from 46% of their total trade deficit in 1992 
to 58% in 1997 and 60% in 1998 - amounting to US$30 billion in 1998 instead of 
US$12 billion in 1992. Under these conditions, it is highly likely that import-
competing Mediterranean producers would intensify their pressure on MGs to frustrate 
their commitment to reform. Instead of providing meaningful concessions that would 
enable MGs to strike alliances with exporter-oriented producers, the EU has basically 
left its partners to fend for themselves. 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
The evidence above suggests that the EMP is designed in a way that contradicts the 
third condition indicated above. For a reforming MC, the partnership seems to imply 
having to deliver trade and other economic reforms now without getting any tangible 
trade concessions from the EU even in the foreseeable future. Under this condition, 
the EMP becomes an essentially short-term bargain - whereby MCs benefit from 
increased MEDA grants and EIB loans and not long-term benefits of economic 
reform, which the EMP was supposed to ‘anchor’.  
 
                                                     
9 The average CCT on industrial products is currently less than 4 percent (Pelkmans and Brenton , 
1999:.104). 
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The underlying assumption of the EU is that its increased financial assistance can 
compensate for the absence or market access concessions. However, the amounts of 
aid needed to extract MCs from their current predicament are both very large and 
unavailable.10
 
 There is no political will in the EU to have the equivalent of the 
Marshall Plan for these countries. Some numbers shall help illustrate this point.   
Using 1999 as a benchmark, the EU had committed itself to distribute to each of the 
citizens of the 9 relevant MCs (representing a population of 224 million people) about 
€9, half of it in the form of loans from the EIB.11 But even if the aid programs are 
streamlined, as is the case for MEDA II, it is unrealistic to believe that €9 per year per 
capita can be instrumental in reforming or transforming economic reality (Telo, 2001: 
182; Escribano and Lorca, 2001: 54). The argument that MEDA can be interpreted as 
a ‘signal’ to foreign investors would be too far-fetched12
 
. As a point of reference, let 
us bear in mind that the US has been transferring each year US$ 2.2 billion (i.e. €2.5 
billion) to Egypt alone since 1979. This is more than three times the annual average of 
MEDA assistance to the whole region under MEDA II and, to date, US assistance has 
had little effect on policy reform in Egypt or inward FDI.  
Conclusions 
 
The analysis above reflects serious shortcomings in the economic pillar of the EMP as a 
potential anchor for policy reform. On the one hand, AAs and the MEDA assistance 
framework are essentially ‘incomplete’ contracts that leave substantial scope for 
discretion by the EU or by MCs. On the other hand, AAs and the MEDA framework 
reflect an EU preference to avoid ‘public bads’ associated with economic 
underdevelopment and political stability in MCs, but they do not reflect an EU 
commitment to the cost of avoiding such public bads. This is in conflict with the theory 
                                                     
10 This point has been underlined by many scholars. See, for example, Marks (1996 : 16); Romeo 
(1998: 30-31). 
 
11 This is less than 1% of GDP. In practice, the amounts actually disbursed were much smaller mainly 
for administrative reasons. By way of comparison, Portugal and Greece have received support from the 
EU over the last 5 years equivalent to 2.7% and 3.7% of GDP. 
 
12 On the contrast between MEDA and pre-accession strategies for Central European candidates, see 
Bevan et al. (2001). 
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of public goods, which predicts that the latter will be under-supplied unless all potential 
beneficiaries contribute to the cost of their supply.  
 
That is why economic concessions that the EU offers for the establishment of a ‘zone of 
shared prosperity’ through a ‘real partnership’ are not only insufficient but also too 
back-loaded to entice Mediterranean politicians to ‘tie their hands’. In our opinion, the 
attractiveness of the EMP as an anchor for policy reform in MCs could have been 
increased if the association agreements had contained more tangible and immediate 
trade concessions - especially in agriculture, processed food and with respect to rules of 
origin (as proposed more than a decade ago by Tovias, 1992: 125-7). By the same 
token, we also think that the reliance on financial assistance is a misguided strategy for 
two reasons. First, the contractual framework is neither ‘tight’ nor ‘fair’ enough to 
ensure that MGs embark on and remain committed to policy reforms. Secondly, and 
even if the ‘completeness’ and ‘fairness’ conditions are satisfied, the impact of financial 
aid on policy reform is ‘fungible’. To the extent that this is the case, financial aid boils 
down to income transfers rather than anchoring policy reform (on this, see Cook and 
Sachs, 1999: 437). The opening of new export markets through EU concessions, 
however, reduces the domestic pressure on the reforming MGs directly and allows 
Mediterranean politicians to strike alliances with export-oriented producers.  
 
In the light of these findings, we conclude by arguing that the EU’s capacity to act as 
an effective anchor for policy reform in non-member countries is highly limited. The 
limitation is due to three factors that render the endogenously-determined anchoring 
arrangement sub-optimal. The first fact is discretion. Both the EU and its trading 
partners (with the exception of candidates for EU membership who are faced with 
tighter conditionality and greater rewards) tend to prefer a high degree of discretion 
built into trade and co-operation agreements. As a result, the risk of non-compliance 
(i.e., the risk of anchor failure) is high. 
 
The second factor that weakens the EU’s anchoring capacity is the limited amount of 
side-payments (especially market access) that the EU is prepared to offer in return for 
policy reform by its trading partners. The EU’s side-payments can be increased only if 
EU governments, like reforming governments, can find a way out of their current 
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vulnerability to pressure from their own veto groups such as agricultural lobbies or 
industrial producers who have to compete with imports from trading partners.  
 
The third factor that contributes to the weakness of the EU as an external anchor is the 
EU policy-making process itself. In this process, national governments are essentially 
veto players who, like veto players at the national level, are able either to capture the 
rule-setting body or to stall decisions in policy areas deemed to be ‘sensitive’. 
Therefore, the EU’s approach to policy reform in its trading partners is highly likely 
to be influenced by changing foreign policy preferences of some member states or by 
changes in the compositions of the member states through enlargement. 
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Figure 1: Optimal and Sub-Optimal Levels of Policy Reform and Anchoring 
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Table 1: Reform v. MEDA Assistance Ranking  
 
Country Reform rank(1) MEDA rank(2) MEDA assistance(3)  
 
Algeria  1   1   1.40 
Morocco  2   5   6.01 
Syria   3   3   1.66 
Egypt   4   4   2.84 
Tunisia  5   6   11.61 
Jordan   6   7   14.30 
Turkey   7   2   1.50 
 
. 
Note: 
(1): Higher reform rank indicates higher level of reform by the end of 1999. 
(2): Higher MEDA rank reflects higher per capita MEDA assistance received. 
(3): MEDA commitments in Euros: per capita per year, 1995-1999.  
 
Source
 
: World Bank Atlas (2001) for components of the reform index; Philippart 
(2001) and DAC (2000) for MEDA rank and assistance. 
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Table 2: Trade balance of MCs with the EU 
  1987  1992  1997  1998 
 
Algeria 1347   3859   3889   1712 
Egypt  -2691  -1483  -3410  -4781  
Jordan  -832  - 937  -1129  -1046 
Morocco -561  - 758  -1265  - 840 
Tunisia -431  -1545  -1438  -1664 
Syria  -331    576   811                  -24 
Turkey  -954  -2723  -12621  -10631 
 
Source
 
: FEMISE (2000: 105) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
